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 What challenges are posed to formally secular states when religious parties grow in 
power?  Studies of late twentieth century/early twenty-first century Turkey and India begin to 
answer that question.  A major tenet on which both countries were founded was secularism, and 
their constitutions explicitly state that religion and politics should be separate.   Still, millions 
(and billions, in India’s case) of religious adherents call these two countries home.  Moreover, 
both countries have seen the rise of religious political parties in recent years.  This poses a 
problem, as religious and economic minorities have seen their freedoms decrease.  For example, 
anti-religious rhetoric in Turkey is reprimanded, and openly practicing Muslims in India have 
seen their houses of worship and fellow Muslims attacked.  The AKP remains in power today in 
Turkey, and although the BJP lost control of Parliament to the United Progressive Alliance, 
headed by the Indian National Congress, the party remains very strong.  To what extent do 
states’ formal commitments to secularism constrain these parties from pursuing a religious 
agenda?  Do citizens support these parties solely for religious purposes or do they merely believe 
they are best to lead their countries economically and socially?  What explains the success (and 
failures) of religious parties in secular democracies?  This paper will attempt to answer these 
questions, while keeping in mind that the rise of religious parties is an ongoing phenomenon 
whose effects will not be able to be fully explained at the present time.   
 Why choose these cases?  Besides their shared commitment to secularism, Turkey and 
India differ in history, religious and economic demographics, population size and more.  Still, 
they are both republics founded in the 20th century that have gone through a great deal of 
technological and economic changes.  They have also seen the rise of religion-based parties – the 
AKP (Turkey, Islam) and the BJP (India, Hinduism) – that have challenged the countries’ secular 
constitutions.  Democracies have been emerging in the Middle East and Asia throughout the past 
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few decades, particularly in countries with large Muslim populations.  Insight and advice can be 
gained from examining these cases as to how new democratic governments can succeed in 
countries where religion is central to daily life.   
 The Republic of Turkey is located on the threshold of two different continents, and in 
some sense, two different worlds.  The Turkish government embraced secularism as its national 
religious policy when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
Adopting the European concept of identity defined by place and language (as opposed to religion 
and genealogy), he created “a Turkish identity – a loyalty to a land –” independent of the 
religious practices of its inhabitants.1  This associated the modern Turkish Republic with the 
Western world.   
 Atatürk also made Turkey similar to the West in another way: neutrality of government 
to religion.  “Atatürk believed secular nationalism was an essential hallmark of modernity and 
progress.”2   Although ninety-nine percent of Turks are Muslim, the government has tried to 
remain strictly secular.  Along with the founding of the Republic, Atatürk and his administration 
rid the government of all previous Islamic influences: they “disposed of the governing caliphate, 
the Arabic alphabet [and] Islamic education.”3   In the eyes of many, Turkey has thrived as a 
secular democracy:  “Of the fifty-one sovereign states that make up the membership of the 
International Islamic Conference…only one in modern times has passed the more searching test, 
of a second change of rulers by democratic procedures – of a government willing to submit to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  	  	  	  	  Harold Rhode, “Turkey: Between Ataturk’s Secularism and Fundamentalist Islam,” Jerusalem Center for Public 
Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 24 (2012), accessed October 8, 2012, http://jcpa.org/article/turkey-between-
ataturk%E2%80%99s-secularism-and-fundamentalist-islam/.	  	  
2      Roger Hardy, “Islam in Turkey: Odd one out,” BBC News, September 26, 2003, accessed October 8, 2012, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/3192647.stm. 
3      Ömer Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model?,” Brookings Institution (April 2012), accessed October 8, 2012, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar.  
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will of the people and leave by the self-same route by which it came.  That one is the Turkish 
Republic”.4  In “Why Turkey is the only Muslim Democracy” (written in 1994), Bernard Lewis 
attributes a myriad of factors to the success of democracy on the Anatolian peninsula.  In 
addition to Turkey’s lack of imperial rule by a European country, longstanding connection with 
the West and fruitful economic growth, Lewis points to Turkey’s secular government as a major 
reason for the country’s commitment to democracy.  Following the founding of the Turkish 
Republic, Atatürk implemented “a series of radical measures, including the disestablishment of 
Islam, the virtual repeal of the Sacred Law (Shari’a), and the enactment in their place of civil 
and criminal codes of a nonreligious character.”5   Yet after Lewis’s article was written, the 
Turkish government has seen a shift away from secularism and towards Islamism with the rise of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP – Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in Turkish).  Atatürk’s 
political philosophy, Kemalism, has come under attack.  “The core elements of Kemalism are 
secularism, nationalism, statism, and identification with Europe.  All of these concepts are the 
subject of lively debate in today’s Turkey, and the ruling Justice and Development Party comes 
from a tradition that challenges many of the Kermalist principles.”6   As the power and influence 
of the AKP continues to grow, both Turkish citizens and global observers alike are questioning 
whether a major shift will occur in Turkey’s political ideology.  The state of Turkey is definitely 
changing, and the AKP introduced religious and domestic reforms that have been met with both 
praise and criticism.  As the country moves further into the twenty-first century, will the Turkish 
government be able to maintain its secular character, or will it cease to be a model of a 
nonreligious democracy in a strictly Muslim country?     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4        Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey Is the only Muslim Democracy,” The Middle East Quarterly (March 1994): 41-
49, accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.meforum.org/216/why-turkey-is-the-only-muslim-democracy. 
5      Lewis, “Why Turkey is the.”  
6      Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, “Background Note: Turkey,” last modified 
March 20, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm. 
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The AKP emerged in the early twentieth-first century, but its roots can be traced to the 
earlier Welfare (Refah) Party, founded in 1983 and banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
in 1998, and the Virtue (Fazilet) Party, founded in 1997 and disbanded in 2001.7   The AKP’s 
connection to Islam is less overt than the earlier religious parties and has seen more political 
successes.  The AKP currently holds a majority of seats in Parliament – 327 compared to the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) with 135, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) with 52, and 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) with 29 seats, and seven independents.8   It has maintained a 
majority in Parliament in the last three elections, with the percentages in its favor increasing each 
time (roughly 34 percent in 2002, 47 percent in 2007 and 50 percent in 2011).9  Many believe the 
power of the AKP threatens not only Turkey’s secularism but the institution of democracy as a 
whole.  Sami Zubaida of the University of London indicated that “pluralism is now threatened by 
the repeated electoral successes of the AKP, establishing, in effect, the bases for a majoritarian 
authoritarianism, at both the institutional and the communal levels.”10   With the success of the 
AKP only increasing, it does not look like the party will be relinquishing control any time soon.  
Fears of an authoritarian government cloud the minds of some Turks, despite the fact that the 
AKP increased protections of civil liberties in some areas (while limiting them in others).  Still, 
the AKP has the support of not only the traditional religious conservatives but also a growing, 
pious middle class.   
Most scholars believe that the AKP came to power not because of its more 
fundamentalist Islamic roots but because of a desire for change within the Turkish public. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7      Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model.” 
8      Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note.”  
9        E. Fuat Keyman and Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The Era of Dominant-Party Politics,” Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2012): 85-99, accessed October 3, 2012, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v023/23.1.muftuler-bac.html.	  
10      Ofra Bengio, “Are Iraq and Turkey Models for Democratization,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2012): 53-
62, accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.meforum.org/3293/iraq-turkey-democratization. 
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an economic downturn, Turkish citizens yearned for a variation in government.  The AKP was 
able to deliver that change. “The party’s success…has little to do with ideological factors.  
Turkish voters have been primarily concerned with bread-and-butter issues…particularly in 
health care and housing.”11   Thus, the success of the AKP may be more accurately attributed to 
Turkey’s economic growth in the early twenty-first century.  “With the economy having tripled 
in size since 2002 to become the 15th largest in the world, thanks in part to a significant 
expansion of exports to the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, the AKP won the 
support of the Turkish bourgeoisie.  From 2001 to 2012, per capita income almost doubled from 
$7,350 to $13,577.12   The AKP has also made advancements in healthcare, pension systems, 
road maintenance and housing construction.13   Partly due to these successes, the AKP was re-
elected in 2007 and 2011.14   Nonetheless, Turkey’s economy began to plummet in 2008-2009; it 
has since picked up again.  As well, some Turkish citizens are beginning to see past the initial 
economic successes of the AKP and question its ideological stances.   
There is an apparent tension between the AKP, devout Muslims and secularists in 
Turkey.  “…The country is polarized between, on the one hand, pious (and sometimes politically 
active) Muslims and, on the other, the secular urban elite, which includes the powerful 
military.”15  The military, often seen as the safeguard of Turkish secularism, has intervened three 
times in the past century when it saw the Turkish government become too religious.  
Interestingly, the military has not tried to hold power longer than necessary: “…Unlike other 
countries, after the military acted to restore order – as required by Turkey’s constitution – it then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11      Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model.” 
12      Keyman and Müftüer-Baç, “The Era of Dominant.” 
13      Keyman and Müftüer-Baç, “The Era of Dominant.”  
14      Jean Shaoul, “AKP government moves against Turkish army,” World Socialist Web Site, September 29, 2012, 
accessed October 3, 2012, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/sep2012/turk-s29.shtml. 
15      Hardy, “Islam in Turkey.” 
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returned to its barracks.”16   The AKP reduced the size of the military over the past decade, and 
the party’s opponents see that as a threat to Turkey’s secularism.  “They balked…at AKP 
measures to increase the ratio of civilians to military officers on the National Security Council, 
elect a civilian to head the National Security Council, remove military representatives from the 
boards of the Council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council….”17   
The AKP has also taken legal action against the military and other secularists: “…the Erdogan 
government has adroitly exploited the high-profile arrests and mounting public opinion against 
the army’s involvement in politics…to launch a wider offensive against the military and other 
Kemalist institutions.  In the last year alone, the AKP government has detained more people, 
including journalists, on dubious charges of conspiracy.”18   Secularists are also wary of the 
increased friendliness between Turkey and traditionally Islamic nations like Iran.19   They 
believe these alliances will lead to increased Islamism in the Turkish government. 
Secularists and opponents of the AKP have tried to challenge the political party’s power, 
but the results have been almost futile.  Necdet, a middle-aged Turkish man protesting in the 
streets of Istanbul, told Washington Post journalist Claire Berlinski in 2007 that he wished the 
military to interfere again and root the AKP out of office by claiming that it is “the military’s 
constitutional role.”20  But does that not threaten the institution of democracy in itself?  In order 
to defend democracy (and by extension, secularism), some Turkish citizens suggest violating 
those very ideals.  Berlinski also suggests that the AKP came to power democratically, and that 
their current position in Turkish government is in fact the embodiment of democracy and popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16      Rhode, “Turkey: Between Atatürk’s Secularism.” 
17      Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model.” 
18      Ehud Toledano, “The AKP’s New Turkey,” Hudson Institute, April 22, 2011, accessed October 8, 2012, 
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-akps-new-turkey. 
19      Toledano, “The AKP’s New Turkey.” 
20	  	  	  	  	  	  Claire Berlinski, “In Turkey, a Looming Battle Over Islam,” The Washington Post, May 6, 2007, accessed 
October 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050402564.html. 
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sovereignty.  Ömer Taşpinar of the Woodrow Wilson Center agreed with Berlinski’s sentiment, 
suggesting that “a tradition of free and fair elections and capitalism [in Turkey] has encouraged 
Islamic parties to play by the rules.”21  Even so, New York Times journalist Thomas L. Friedman 
believes that the true character of the AKP will not be tested until another political party takes 
over the majority.  Arguing against Turkey being used as a model of a functioning Islamic 
democracy, Friedman stated that he “will only cite the AKP as a reassuring example of Islam and 
democracy in harmony after [he sees] it lose an election and vacate power.”22   Still, the problem 
in Turkey regarding politics and religion is very evident and relevant.  A proportion of the 
population is not happy with the current government’s Islamic ties and is willing to take action.   
Along with the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics, religious influence in other areas of 
society is growing.  One major area is education, especially at the primary level.  There is a 
divide between secularists and a middle class of pious Muslims over the role of Islam in public 
schools.23  In 2012, Koran lessons were implemented.  This led to an outcry among secularists, 
who claim that “the emphasis on religious education is part of a controversial overhaul of the 
national curriculum, which many argue flies in the face of the rigidly secular principles of Kemal 
Atatürk.”24   Another area affected by the rise of Islamism is women’s rights.  Some secularists 
think that women are slowly seeing their freedoms decline and believe Erdoğan’s policies depart 
from Turkey’s more progressive past, especially in regard to family values and gender equality.25     
Prime Minister Erdoğan would like to ban all abortions, believing the practice akin to murder.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21      Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model.” 
22      Thomas L. Friedman, “Trust, but Verify,” The New York Times, January 17, 2012, accessed October 10, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/trust-but-verify.html?_r=0. 
23      Thomas Seibert, “Secularists: Government plan favours Islamic schools in Turkey,” The National, March 11, 
2012, accessed October 2, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/secularists-government-plan-favours-
islamic-schools-in-turkey.	  
24      “Peddling religion: Why secular academics fret about an ‘Islamic bicycle,’” The Economist, September 15, 
2012, accessed October 6, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21562945. 
25      Taşpinar, “Turkey: The New Model.” 
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Abortion became legal in Turkey in 1983, and ten percent of Turkish pregnancies end in abortion 
(which is relatively low compared to the thirty percent of pregnancies ended by abortion in 
Europe).26   In addition, religious headscarves worn by women are becoming a more common 
occurrence on the street, and this topic has become a subject of dispute.   “Muslim women argue 
that wearing a headscarf is a human right and a religious duty.  Secularists see the headscarf as a 
provocative political symbol, and have managed to get it banned from universities, state schools 
and government ministries.”27   The AKP has also increased censorship towards anti-Islamic 
remarks.  In June, classical and jazz pianist Fazil Say was charged “with insulting Islamic values 
in Twitter messages, the latest in a series of legal actions against Turkish artists, writers and 
intellectuals for statements they have made against religion and Turkish national identity.”28   
While he believes his human rights were violated, the self-declared atheist could face up to 
eighteen months in prison.  Clearly, speaking out against Islam or the government is not tolerated 
by the AKP.  Freedom of speech, a staple of ideal democracies, is curtailed in Turkey. 
 Like Turkey, the power of religious parties has expanded in India in recent decades.  
However, in contrast to Turkey, Indian religious parties have been arguably less successful in 
maintaining control.  The Indian Republic was founded in 1947, when the former colony broke 
free of British rule and established a democracy.  India’s diversity in both religion and 
socioeconomics has resulted in a myriad of political parties.  The most dominant party has been 
the Indian National Congress, the party of Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.  From 
1947 until 1998, Congress almost always controlled the Indian Parliament.  Nonetheless, new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26      Arash Ahmadi, “Turkey PM sparks row over abortion,” BBC News, June 1, 2012, accessed October 10, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18297760. 
27      Hardy, “Islam in Turkey.” 
28      Sebnem Arsu and Daniel J. Wakin, “Turkish Pianist Is Accused of Insulting Islam,” New York Times, June 1, 
2012, accessed October 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/world/europe/turkey-charges-pianist-fazil-
say-over-twitter-posts.html?_r=0. 
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parties were emerging, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  This occurrence can 
partially be attributed to the theory of political development, a phenomenon in which voters’ 
attitudes towards politics evolve as they become more educated.  As India modernized, voters 
became more politically diverse.  This benefited the BJP: “It has been well documented that in 
societies where there are diverse ethnic groups marked by a rural-urban gap, modernization 
affects groups unevenly.  In such instances, political parties that can mobilize support in all 
sectors of society usually end up with electoral successes.”29  The party was gradually able to 
attract various groups’ support.  Despite the party’s coalition not constituting a majority in 
Parliament until 1998, the BJP began mobilizing its supporters long before then.   
 Although its coalition did not attain the majority in Parliament until 1998, the BJP began 
gaining power throughout the second half of the 20th century.  A major aspect of the BJP’s 
platform is its commitment to Hindutva, or Hindu Nationalism.  Unlike the secular Congress, 
“the country’s radical nationalists view the secular political system as a threat to Hindu identity, 
largely in view of the power it offers India’s 240 million Muslims.  Weakening, or even 
abolishing, the secular state has become part of the radical nationalist agenda.”30  Nonetheless, 
the BJP’s main motivation was political.  With the Indian National Congress weakened, the BJP 
and rival political parties looked for ways to mobilize the masses.  In the case of the BJP, 
religion was used as a means of mobilization: “The BJP is pragmatic and even opportunistic, 
manipulating religious symbols, monuments, ideas, and personalities in the quest for political 
office.  By employing these strategies, the party has mobilized the masses, reconceptualizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29      Rekha Datta, “Hindu Nationalism or Pragmatic Party Politics? A Study of India’s Hindu Party,” International 
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1999), accessed November 17, 2012, http://0-	  
ehis.ebscohost.com.helin.uri.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=128ab7aa-8666-4c89-a917-
108d570c2e1a%40sessionmgr115&vid=5&hid=102. 
30      Sharif Shuja, “India’s 2004 Elections: Implications for the Future,” National Observer, No. 63(Summer 2005): 
30-35, accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.nationalobserver.net/2005_summer_108.htm.	  
10 
 
	  
Hinduism and conflating it with an extravagant type of Indian nationalism.”31  Rehka Datta 
described this religious nationalism as “a political and practical necessity.”32  The BJP 
recognized the needed for a resurgence of nationalism in order to gain office and used Hinduism 
as a means of to that goal.    
Fundamentalist Hindus support the BJP in masses, especially those of higher castes.  A 
1993 study of Indian party activists reveals that fifty-nine percent of BJP activists identify as 
religious (meaning they pray, attend religious meetings and go to temple), compared to twenty 
percent of their Congress counterparts.33  BJP members were also more likely to see their 
religion (Hinduism) as different from other religions.  However, religious devotees were not the 
only contingent to vote for the BJP: “There is little in the way of substantive evidence, however, 
that Hindus have either become more religious or that they were willing to express their 
religiosity more politically…the BJP was electorally successful on account of its ability to forge 
a coalition between religious groups and the middle classes.”34  The middle class largely 
supported the BJP because of the party’s economic reforms.  A new “coalition” of sorts was 
formed between religious fundamentalists and the financially-motivated middle class.  
Positioning itself as the party of laissez-faire economics, the BJP “emerged in the 1990s as an 
ardent critic of state intervention.  It was this programmatic shift which enabled the BJP to 
garner the support of the middle classes, who were ‘mobilizable’ because of their growing 
disaffection with the political and economic policies pursued by the Congress Party.”35  The BJP 
also capitalized on a growing anti-Western sentiment and advocated economic policies different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31      Datta, “Hindu Nationalism or Pragmatic.”  
32      Datta, “Hindu Nationalism or Pragmatic.” 
33      Pradeep Chibber, “Who voted for the Bharatiya Janata Party?,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, 
No. 4 (October 1997): 631-639, accessed November 18, 2012,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/194232. 
34      Chibber, “Who voted for the Bharatiya.”  
35      Chibber, “Who voted for the Bharatiya.”  
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from those of the Western powers.  The Party’s official platform stated: “‘A modern India, to the 
BJP, is not a Westernized India.’ In essence, the BJP government welcomes privatization, 
foreign investment, and self-reliance and does not seek to debar foreign firms in the name of 
economic nationalism.”36   
 Despite support from the middle class, the BJP does not garner the votes of the entire 
Hindu contingent.  India’s caste system has its roots in Hinduism, and this organization of people 
based on birth and class marginalizes many Indians.  Even though the BJP is a religious party, 
not all religious Hindus would benefit under its rule.  Those in the higher castes are much better 
off.  Thus, “the strongest influence on voting preference is observed in terms of class 
division…the BJP is highly preferred among the middle class and rich SC’s (scheduled 
castes).”37 In the 1998 elections, the votes the BJP did receive from members of scheduled castes 
came more so from those in the upper class (22.75 percent of the SC vote) than the middle and 
lower classes (10 percent of the vote).38  This makes sense; even though members of the 
scheduled castes are automatically put at a disadvantage under Hindutva, those of the upper class 
benefit more from the economic politics of the BJP.  Pushpendra even suggested the BJP could 
be labeled as “not only a party of the caste Hindus, but also as a party of the upper class cutting 
across all caste groups.”39  Overall, by advocating a Hindu Nationalism the BJP is suggesting 
that those of lower castes are unequal to those of higher castes.  
 The alienation of non-Hindus, especially Muslims, in addition to the economically 
disadvantaged is another reason attributed to the BJP’s loss in the 2004 election.  Indian Muslims 
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believe their freedom is threatened by the BJP.   India’s electoral system (plurality or first-past-
the-post) makes it difficult for Muslims representatives to win seats in Parliament in states other 
than Jammu and Kashmir, where they account for a majority of the population.  Even so, 
representatives in Lok Sabha (the Lower House of the Indian Parliament) from Jammu and 
Kashmir are not uniformly Muslim: the state’s members are split between Muslims, Hindus and 
Buddhists.40  The Muslim representation in Lok Sabha is not proportional to the Muslim 
population in India as a whole; contrastingly, Jains, Sikhs and Christians are represented in 
government at a fairly accurate percentage.  This may be a result of the concentration of minority 
religions in specific regions of India.   
The BJP has never been a party in which many Muslims feel welcome.  “Its politics of 
Hindu nationalism has thrived on demonizing the Muslim (and occasionally Christian) minority, 
on the view that minorities are not entitled to special rights.”41  A major issue of contention in 
Indian history was the 1992 destruction of a Muslim mosque in Ayodhya.42  Many actually 
believe that this act was prompted by BJP leaders.  Today, the BJP and its supporters wish to 
build a Hindu temple at the site, and Muslims are not pleased.  Not only has this angered 
Muslims, but Hindu Indians who yearn for peace are also distraught.  After an attack on Gujarat 
Muslims in 2002 that resulted in 2,000 deaths, the BJP’s opponents reached their breaking 
points.43  Former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s failure to reprimand the offenders lost the party 
support from others, including “the 21 coalition partners, media and vibrant Indian civil society 
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organisations.”44  Yet the BJP still won elections at the state level, and Chief Minister Narendra 
Modi of Gujarat was reelected.  This exemplifies the disparity that can occur between state and 
national levels of government within a country.    
 The BJP-led coalition lost majority control in Parliament in 2004 to Congress’s United 
Progressive Alliance.  National Catholic Reporter journalist Francis Gonsalves suggested that 
Indian voters chose Congress over the BJP “for basic needs – rota-kapda-makaan (food, clothing 
and housing) – over economic liberalism.”45  This is similar to Turkey – many voters supported 
the AKP not because of its Islamist background but because of its ability to provide basic goods 
and services to the public.  Despite the illusion of an economic boom, Congress attacked the BJP 
for covering up unexpected financial disappointments: “It highlighted the first-time negative 
employment growth that the country had seen during the N.D.A. years, with unemployment 
crossing the 10 million mark…[Congress was] maintaining that during the N.D.A.’s five-year 
rule, the growth rate was just five percent.”46  Moreover, the so-called “shining” of India during 
the BJP years did not reach all people: “India’s resurgence, unfortunately, failed to reach the 
hundreds of millions living in poverty in rural areas, where electricity, jobs and clean water are 
luxuries.  It was rural Indians who voted in decisive numbers, not the urban upper class that has 
been the main winner from the boom.”47   Still, Gonsalves asserts that religious fundamentalism 
was the BJP’s main undoing.  Even religious Hindus yearned for peace, and there was not peace 
in a country where the rights of lower classes and Muslims were marginalized.   
 Even though Congress leads the majority coalition, the United Progressive Alliance, in 
India’s current Parliament, the BJP remains strong.  In order to attract more widespread support, 
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the BJP has “decided to strive for an ‘imaginative reprojection’ of its ‘commitment to 
secularism.’”48  Congress representative Renuka Chowdhary called the BJP’s bluff.  She argues 
that the party affirms its pledge to secularism in order to receive votes.  There is still an ongoing 
battle for majority control between Congress’s United Progressive Alliance and the BJP’s 
National Democratic Alliance.  
 The AKP and BJP currently have a strong presence in the Turkish and Indian 
governments.  Their connection to religion has been downplayed with both words and actions.  
An abandonment of religious rhetoric in favor of more secular terms permeated both the Refah 
Party (RP, the AKP’s religious predecessor) and the BJP’s platforms upon their initial election to 
office.  Distancing themselves from the more radical religious parties that came before, “both 
parties adopt[ed] a moralistic tone and [were] adept at using some of the buzzwords of liberal 
politics like ‘civil society’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘social consensus’ even when denouncing and 
distancing themselves from the established ‘system’.”49 Still, authors Nitish Dutt and Eddie J. 
Girdner argue that this was not necessary because religious rhetoric is only threatening to the 
institution of democracy when it is put into action.  Moreover, the absence of religious rhetoric 
has not always proved successful.  The Refah Party changed its name to the Virtue (Fazilet) 
Party to distance itself from Islam but was still removed from power by the Turkish military in 
1997.50  Furthermore, Prime Minister Erdoğan “crafted the term conservative democracy – rather 
than an Islamic reference – to explain his political agenda.”51   Despite these efforts, the AKP is 
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still referred to as Turkey’s “Islamist Party.”  Religious parties also appeal to political tradition in 
India in order to attract support.  The BJP-sponsored 500-mile march not only garnered Hindu 
backing but connected the BJP with Gandhi’s movement against British colonial rule (an 
undertaking that was entirely secular).  The opposite has been true for the AKP in Turkey.  
Separating themselves from both Atatürk’s strict secularism and previous religious parties’ 
extreme Islamism, the AKP seeks to find a balance between religion and government.   
 The changing rhetoric is not all for show – both the AKP and BJP have actually 
moderated in some aspects.  Referring again to the RP and BJP, Dutt and Girdner stated that the 
parties were willing to moderate in order to gain political support: “This fact is clearly 
demonstrated by the RP’s 1996 efforts to form a coalition government, and the BJP’s pre-1999 
electoral urgency to form alliances with other regional parties regardless of the fact that none of 
the even remotely identified with its brand of religious nationalism.”52  They value political 
opportunism over religious devotedness.  Nonetheless, the BJP in particular has struggled with 
finding a balance between moderation and staunch religiosity.  The party’s candidate for Prime 
Minister in 2009, L. K. Advani, was a former fundamentalist who tried to reshape his image as a 
moderate in order to appeal to a wider range of voters.  He was unsuccessful, and a fellow 
member of his party said he failed because he was “neither fully center nor totally right.”53  
Neither the stalwartly religious nor true moderates completely identified with Advani.  Like the 
BJP, the AKP’s ideology has also shifted towards the center – instead of emphasizing Islam as 
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the main philosophy guiding the party, the AKP strives towards democracy, national will, people 
power and economic development.54   
One of the specific factors encouraging the moderation of political parties is the necessity 
for coalition governments.  Coalition governments are a facet of parliamentary democracy that 
can either weaken or strengthen the power of religious parties.  They have become more 
conventional in India throughout the past few decades, and although they still exist in Turkey, 
they have become less common since the early 2000s.  Turkish political parties have faced 
struggles in forming successful coalition governments, although groups like the Welfare Party 
(Refah Party or RP) were open to forming coalitions in the late 1990s.  To the RP’s 
disadvantage, coalitions initially formed to keep the Islamic party out of power.  While having 
the most number of seats in Parliament (158 out of 550), the Welfare Party did not constitute a 
majority.55  Afraid of the RP pursuing a potential religious agenda, former enemies Mesut 
Yilmaz of the Motherland Party and Tansu Ciller, the Prime Minister and leader of the True Path 
Party, decided to join forces.56  Refah leader Necmettian Erbakan chastised this move, calling the 
new government “an abnormal creature born from a forced marriage.”57  He correctly predicted 
inevitable governmental chaos.  Erbakan would go on to become Prime Minister after forming an 
alliance with the True Path Party only to be removed by the Turkish military a year later.  In 
India’s case, the BJP was forced to join with secular parties in order to gain a majority in 
Parliament.  This forced the BJP to moderate.  In some instances, however, the party did not 
moderate enough.  After failing to reprimand the Hindu nationalists who murdered some 2,000 
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Gujarat Muslims in 2002, the BJP lost the support of many of its coalition partners.  This 
partially led to the BJP’s removal from power in 2004.  Still, the BJP attempted to court Muslim 
politicians.  While Congress was seen as the de facto party for Muslim voters (as Congress 
championed minority privileges), the BJP began actively courting Muslim politicians in the late 
1990s.  Already underrepresented with Congress in power, some politicians defected to the BJP.  
Given the chance, they hoped to influence and alter the party’s stance on Muslims’ role in Indian 
society.  Rationalizing his decision to join the BJP (which was gaining in political power), 
Muslim leader Arif Mohammed Khan said “Suddenly I realised the BJP is telling me ‘you come 
into the party, we want to correct the distortions in our image, we want to take everyone 
along’…They are extending their hand, they say they want to correct the situation.  We have to 
catch hold of this extended hand.”58  It is worth noting the Khan has since left the BJP and is 
now a leader of the rival Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).  Moreover, although 35 Muslim candidates 
won office in the 2004 election, no Muslim candidate was elected to the Fourteenth Lok Sabha in 
2004 from the BJP.59  
The successes and failures of religious parties in Turkey and India often go hand-in-hand 
with the countries’ standards of living.  Even though some sects of Indian society were thriving, 
“the United Nation’s 2003 human development report calculated that 47 per cent of Indian 
children under the age of five were under weight.  An estimated 300 million Indians survive on 
less than $1 a day, and 160 million lack access to clean water.”60  The BJP has not been able to 
provide necessitates to Indians of all castes, religions and geographic locales.  Contrastingly, the 
AKP was able to adequately make available the “bread-and-butter” materials and services to 
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Turks of all classes.  This is arguably the main reason why the party keeps getting reelected.  
Before becoming Prime Minister, Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul.  During his tenure, he put 
emphasis on local improvements instead of sweeping reforms.  He learned that “local voters 
want efficient road and sewer repair and trash collection, not utopian endeavors to transform 
society.”61  His pragmatic approach to his mayoral duties transferred to his role as Prime 
Minister.  As evidenced by the repeated victories of the AKP and the defeat of the BJP in 2004, 
the rise and fall of religious parties has to do at least partly with the parties’ performances in 
areas outside of religion. 
The relationship between religion and government differs in Turkey and India.  Religion 
is taboo in Turkish government.  With the rise of the AKP has come a limit on free speech, both 
religious and secular.  Citizens who criticize the government are at risk of unemployment or even 
imprisonment.  For example, columnist Ali Akel was fired from her reporting job with the pro-
government newspaper Yeni Safak in February 2012 for attempting to write a piece critical of the 
Prime Minister’s position on the Kurds.62  This issue has resulted in longstanding tensions in 
Turkish society.  The sharp divide between the Turkish military and ruling party also splits the 
country.  Former head of the Turkish armed forces Gen Ilker Basburg explained the strain 
between the two factions:   
[It] reflects a deep hostility and suspicion between two poles of Turkey’s society 
and political establishment.  On the one hand members of Turkey’s military elite 
and their allies see themselves as custodians of Turkey’s secular constitution…On 
the other hand Prime Minister Erodogan and his supporters argue his government 
– popularly elected – represents modern democratic Turkey, tolerant of moderate 
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Islam, and must protect itself from those seeking a return to Turkey’s past history 
of military coups and shadowy army influence.63 
	  	  
The balance between religion and government in both the press and the institution itself is still 
disputed in Turkey.  This differs in India, where citizens and government officials are free to 
express their opinions about religion.  Religion has an impact on some government officials’ 
decisions, and to some extent that is acceptable.  Instead, tension arises in India when people use 
their religion to marginalize others.    
At this point in time, it cannot be disputed that religious parties can exist in Turkey and 
India without the undermining of democracy.  But because the AKP and BJP are relatively new 
to power, the question of whether they will last cannot be answered.  Previous religious parties in 
Turkey have fallen, but those were much more overtly Islamist than the AKP.  It is clear that 
religious parties exist not solely for their religious commitments but because of their economic 
reforms and ability to provide necessities to citizens.  Oftentimes, it is the persistence of 
economic problems that leads to the downfall of religious parties.  This is not to suggest that 
religious fervor does not matter – it is still quite important.  The military in Turkey and the voters 
in India and Turkey play a role in constraining religious parties’ fundamentalism.  Voters can 
limit parties from pursuing a religious agenda (and violating their respective constitutions) by 
voting them out in the following election.  In Turkey, the military oftentimes removes parties it 
feels are too religious before any new election can take place.  There is tension between the AKP 
and the Turkish military, but the military has seen its powers restricted under the AKP and thus 
has not been able to remove the party from office.  As Turkey and India continue to grow, it is 
certain that religion and its appropriate role in government will remain issues of contention.  
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